India and Turkey Relations

India and Turkey share deep civilisational and cultural bonds — from the Sufi tradition and the poetry of Rumi to centuries of trade — yet their modern relationship is best described as a study in paradox: warm at the level of culture and commerce, but persistently strained at the strategic level.

The single biggest reason is Turkey’s enduring tilt towards Pakistan and its repeated interference on Kashmir. This estrangement reached a new low in 2025, when Turkey backed Pakistan during Operation Sindoor.

This section examines the historical roots, the areas of cooperation, the deep irritants, and India’s calibrated response.

Historical Background

Contact dates to the medieval era, with commonalities rooted in the Ottoman period. A striking early episode is the diplomacy of Tipu Sultan, who — alarmed by British expansion — concluded a treaty with Sultan Abdul Hameed and sent an ambassador to Constantinople in 1784, seeking technicians for defence production (though Ottoman preoccupation with Russia limited actual help).

In the modern era, Indians expressed solidarity with Turkey: during the 1912 Balkan Wars, Dr. M. A. Ansari led an Indian medical mission to aid the Turks, and Indians supported the cause of Turkish independence.

India established diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1948. But the Cold War pulled them apart: Turkey joined the US-led NATO alliance, while India championed non-alignment.

Crucially, Turkey’s alignment with the US drew it close to Pakistan — another US ally — planting the seed of a strategic divergence that endures to this day. Ties warmed only after the Cold War, through visits in 2008, 2010 and 2017.

Timeline at a Glance

Areas of Cooperation

Despite strategic friction, several constructive strands keep the relationship alive.

Trade and Commerce

Trade is the most robust pillar. Bilateral trade stands at roughly US$10.4 billion (FY 2023–24), with the balance in India’s favour (exports ~US$6.6 bn, imports ~US$3.8 bn).

India exports mineral fuels, cotton, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, automotive parts and steel, and imports marble, machinery, automobile components and textiles.

Over 170 Indian firms — including GMR, Reliance and Dabur — operate in Turkey, and an institutional framework (the Joint Commission on Economy and Technology, since 1983, and a Joint Economic Committee) supports commerce.

Cultural, Educational and Civilisational

• Shared heritage: The Sufi tradition — especially the influence of the poet Rumi — and a common language-and-culture heritage form a genuine bond.
• Academic exchange: India deputes a professor of Indology / Hindi at Ankara University; Turkish academics teach at JNU and Jamia Millia Islamia; and Turkey receives ITEC scholarships and specialised training (e.g., for auditors).
• Tourism: Turkey was, until recently, a popular destination for Indian tourists and film shoots — a people-to-people link now under strain.

Defence (Historical)

Defence contacts began in the Cold War (PM Turgut Özal’s 1986 visit) and matured with a defence cooperation agreement in 2008 during Erdogan’s visit, including naval and air exchanges. This strand, however, has effectively collapsed given Turkey’s military support to Pakistan.

A Humanitarian Bright Spot — Operation Dost (2023)

When devastating earthquakes struck Turkey and Syria in February 2023, India launched Operation Dost (“dost” meaning “friend”), rushing NDRF search-and-rescue teams, medical units, a field hospital and relief material aboard IAF aircraft.

It was a powerful display of India’s Vishwabandhu / first-responder diplomacy and briefly warmed public sentiment — before politics intervened again.

Persistent Irritants and Challenges

The strategic relationship is weighed down by a cluster of deep, structural irritants — most flowing from Turkey’s alignment with Pakistan.

The Pakistan Tilt and Kashmir

Turkey has consistently sided with Pakistan, irrespective of the government in Ankara. President Erdogan has repeatedly raised Kashmir at the UN General Assembly — especially after the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019 — and called for “multilateral” or third-party mediation, which India firmly rejects as interference in an internal, bilateral matter (governed by the Shimla Agreement).

Blocking India at Multilateral Forums

• NSG membership: Turkey backs the Pakistan-and-China line that India and Pakistan be treated on par for Nuclear Suppliers Group entry — unhelpful to India’s case.
• OIC & Islamist posturing: Turkey uses pan-Islamic rhetoric and OIC platforms in ways that often run counter to Indian interests.

The 2025 Rupture — Operation Sindoor

What happened After the Pahalgam terror attack (April 2025), India launched Operation Sindoor against terror infrastructure in Pakistan. In the ensuing clashes, Pakistan deployed hundreds of drones against Indian positions — among them Turkish-made Asisguard Songar armed drones, and, per Indian briefings, Turkey provided advisory support. This was the first time Turkish defence platforms were used in a live conflict against India. India’s response: New Delhi revoked the security clearance of the Turkish ground-handling firm Çelebi (which operated at nine Indian airports) on national-security grounds; universities suspended academic tie-ups; and a public boycott of Turkish goods and tourism gained momentum.

The Turkey–Pakistan–Azerbaijan Axis

Turkey’s deepening defence and diplomatic axis with Pakistan and Azerbaijan — spanning arms, drones and coordinated diplomacy — poses a growing strategic challenge to India across West Asia, the Caucasus and multilateral forums.

The “Hypocrisy” Argument

Indian diplomats note the inconsistency in Turkey’s lecturing on Kashmir while it faces unresolved disputes of its own — notably its military presence in Cyprus (since 1974) and the Kurdish question — undermining Ankara’s credibility as a would-be mediator.

India’s Response — Counter-Balancing Strategy

Rather than confront Turkey directly, India has adopted a calibrated balancing approach — building leverage through Turkey’s own regional rivals and alternative corridors.

• Cyprus: PM Modi’s June 2025 visit to Cyprus — the first by an Indian PM since 2002 — deepened a Comprehensive Partnership, including access for Indian naval vessels; a pointed signal to Ankara.
• Greece: A Strategic Partnership with Greece (2023), another Turkish rival, anchors India’s Mediterranean outreach, alongside the India–Greece–Cyprus (IGC) business initiative.
• Armenia: Growing defence exports to Armenia (rival of Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan) — including artillery and air-defence systems — expand India’s Caucasus footprint.
• IMEC: The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor routes trade to Europe bypassing Turkey, reducing Ankara’s leverage as a transit hub.
• Economic leverage: India’s large, favourable trade balance and its tourism market give it quiet economic leverage over an economically stressed Turkey.

Way Forward

• Keep channels open: Sustain trade, cultural and people-to-people links even amid strategic friction — diplomacy aims to turn adversaries into neutrals.
• Firm red lines: Continue to firmly reject third-party interference on Kashmir while engaging pragmatically elsewhere.
• Deepen the counterweights: Consolidate ties with Cyprus, Greece, Armenia and the EU to balance the Turkey-Pakistan-Azerbaijan axis.
• Leverage economics: Use India’s market and trade surplus as leverage, while diversifying supply chains away from strategic dependence.
• Engage Turkish society: Invest in academic, business and civil-society links that may, over time, moderate Ankara’s posture.

Conclusion

India–Turkey relations remain a paradox of warm culture and cold strategy. Genuine civilisational affinity — Rumi, Sufism, trade and the goodwill of Operation Dost — coexists with a hard strategic reality: Turkey’s structural alignment with Pakistan, its interference on Kashmir, and — most starkly — its military support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor.

India’s answer has been mature and asymmetric: not confrontation, but counter-balancing through Cyprus, Greece and Armenia, the IMEC corridor, and economic leverage. The long-term goal remains what adroit diplomacy always seeks — to gradually align Turkish interests with India’s, and “warm up a cold Turkey” without compromising on core national interests.