India’s Foreign Policy and Terrorism

Terrorism as a Challenge to India

Terrorism has been among the most persistent threats to India’s security and to the peaceful conduct of its foreign policy. India has been fighting terrorism, particularly in Kashmir, since the 1990s, long before the phenomenon captured global attention.

For decades India warned the world about the dangers of state-sponsored and cross-border terrorism, but a genuine international consensus emerged only after the 9/11 attacks of 2001, which globalised the perception of the threat and validated India’s long-held position.

The central thrust of India’s response has been to build international collaboration to curb terror, forging close counter-terror ties with partners such as Israel, Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, while consistently exposing the state sponsorship of terrorism by Pakistan on global platforms.

The Nature of the Terror Threat

The threat is not monolithic; it has evolved across several overlapping dimensions that a modern counter-terror strategy must address together.

• Cross-border / proxy terrorism: infiltration and attacks sponsored from across the western border, using groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba as instruments of state policy.
• Sub-national insurgency: separatist militancy, most acutely in Kashmir, sustained by external funding and radical ideology.
• Transnational jihadist ideology: the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS), which seeks to penetrate local insurgencies and exploit disaffected cadres for radicalisation.
• Maritime terrorism: the threat of sea-borne attacks, underscored by the 26/11 Mumbai assault, requiring coastal and naval vigilance.
• Terror-financing and radicalisation: the flow of illicit funds and online propaganda that sustain recruitment and street violence.

India’s Conceptual Approach

▸ No ‘Good’ or ‘Bad’ Terrorists

A cornerstone of India’s stance is the principle that there are no good or bad terrorists — all terrorists and their ideologies are equally harmful. This is why India has refused to distinguish a so-called ‘good Taliban’, declining to legitimise any faction through negotiation. The principle rejects the selective tolerance of terror groups for short-term strategic gain.

▸ The Terror–Proliferation Link

At the Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, India advanced the argument that a dangerous link exists between international terrorism and clandestine nuclear proliferation. It advocated weakening this link through information-sharing, robust national laws and cooperation among enforcement agencies — placing the terror threat within the wider architecture of global security.

▸ The Push for a Global Definition — CCIT

The absence of an agreed international definition of terrorism has been a chronic obstacle. India has therefore championed the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT), a proposal it first brought to the United Nations, seeking a binding legal framework and a shared definition.

With the rise of new threats such as ISIS, India has pressed for the early finalisation of the CCIT, a demand it reiterated at the 70th anniversary of the UN in 2015. The convention remains stalled due to disagreements over the very definition of terrorism.

India’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy

India operates on multiple, mutually reinforcing levels — global, regional, bilateral and, increasingly, direct action — to isolate the sponsors of terror and dismantle their infrastructure.

▸ Global Level

Diplomatically, India works to place evidence of Pakistan’s sponsorship of terror before world leaders, building pressure to change Pakistani behaviour.

It uses UN forums to brand Pakistan a sponsor of terrorism and a destabiliser of the region, and works through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to choke terror-financing — a mechanism that placed Pakistan under sustained scrutiny. India also seeks a global consensus on the definition of terrorism through the CCIT.

▸ Regional Level

Regionally, the strategy rests on cooperation and alliances. India leverages the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) for intelligence-sharing and coordinated action, and promotes counter-terror cooperation through BIMSTEC as SAARC has been paralysed by Pakistan’s obstruction.

▸ Bilateral Level

India has deepened dedicated counter-terror partnerships — with Israel, Russia, Iran and the Central Asian states — for intelligence exchange, capacity-building and coordinated diplomatic pressure, denying terror groups safe operating space.

▸ Direct Action and Coercive Diplomacy

India’s posture has shifted from restraint towards proactive response. The cross-border surgical strikes of 2016 and subsequent precision operations signalled a new willingness to strike terror infrastructure directly.

Security policy has also been extended into coercive diplomacy — placing the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance to convey that terror and normal cooperation cannot coexist.

CASE STUDY — From Pahalgam to Operation Sindoor (2025)

The Pahalgam terror attack of 22 April 2025, in which 26 civilians were killed by militants linked to The Resistance Front (a proxy of Lashkar-e-Taiba), triggered a decisive response.

On 7 May 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor, a precision air-and-missile strike on nine terror-linked sites — four in Pakistan and five in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir — targeting the infrastructure of JeM and LeT. Described as focused, calibrated and non-escalatory, it drew a new red line: terror used as state policy will be met with a visible, forceful response.

The China Factor — Selective Shielding of Terror

India’s counter-terror diplomacy has repeatedly been frustrated by China’s protection of Pakistan-based terrorists at the United Nations. The clearest illustration is the Masood Azhar case. After the Pathankot airbase attack (January 2016), India moved the UN Sanctions Committee to list the Jaish-e-Mohammed chief under the 1267 Committee.

Although fourteen of the fifteen Council members favoured the listing, China placed a technical hold, repeating the same obstruction over the 26/11 mastermind Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi.

For India this was incomprehensible, since Jaish-e-Mohammed had itself been a listed terror group since 2001. The episode exposed the absence of a global consensus against terror and the way great-power politics can shield its sponsors. China has similarly backed Pakistan at the FATF.

The prolonged obstruction was ultimately overcome, with Azhar designated a global terrorist, but only after sustained Indian diplomatic pressure.

The Changing Security Situation in Kashmir

Kashmir turned volatile after mid-2016, when the elimination of a prominent militant commander triggered a spike in recruitment and attacks. Pakistan’s aim has been to reduce Kashmir to a purely religious dispute, but the valley’s syncretic culture — Kashmiriyat, which accommodates all faiths — resists this framing.

Pakistan’s strategy has been to destroy Kashmiriyat and impose an imported fundamentalist ideology, polarise society and drive out minorities, as seen in the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits.

A newer danger is the intrusion of ISIS ideology. Having declared Pakistan an apostate ally of the West, ISIS presents itself as an alternative to Pakistan-sponsored groups, attracting disgruntled cadres.

Figures who broke away from established outfits sought to reframe the insurgency as a project for an ‘Islamic State’ in Kashmir, merging splinter factions — a shift from a territorial dispute towards transnational jihad.

▸ Pakistan’s Objectives in Kashmir

Impede India’s economic growth via insecurity	Internationalise the Kashmir dispute
Give the army primacy over civilian politics	Alienate Kashmiri people from India
Synchronise with China’s aim to destabilise India	Use the nuclear bogey to deter Indian responses

▸ The Road Ahead in Kashmir

The way forward blends firmness with a therapeutic approach. Security must be matched by a healing of collective trauma, dialogue that brings separatists into the democratic mainstream, and perception-management (sadbhavna) programmes.

• Choke terror-financing: sustained surveillance of separatist funding to cut off external money for street violence.
• Economic healing: job creation and revival of the horticulture sector, the mainstay of the local economy.
• Counter-radicalisation: a civil-society-backed counter-narrative campaign to de-radicalise the youth.
• Political dialogue: an inclusive, interactive forum spanning all segments of a multilayered society, since dialogue is the only durable exit.
• Engage civilian Pakistan: dilute the primacy of the Pakistani army by engaging its civilian leadership.

Challenges

Challenge	Explanation
No agreed definition	The absence of a universal definition of terrorism keeps the CCIT stalled and lets sponsors exploit legal ambiguity.
Great-power shielding	China’s repeated protection of listed terrorists at the UN and FATF dilutes collective action.
State sponsorship	Use of terror as an instrument of state policy sustains a steady supply of trained proxies and safe havens.
Radicalisation & ISIS	Transnational ideology and online propaganda open new fronts for recruitment among the young.
Porous frontiers	Land and coastal gaps remain infiltration routes for terror operatives.

The Way Forward

• Finalise the CCIT: press for an early conclusion of the Comprehensive Convention to secure a binding global definition and framework.
• Reform UN listing mechanisms: curb the misuse of technical holds that shield designated terrorists.
• Deepen financial choke-points: strengthen FATF and No Money for Terror mechanisms to dismantle terror-financing networks.
• Strengthen regional cooperation: expand intelligence-sharing through SCO-RATS and BIMSTEC to bypass a paralysed SAARC.
• Invest in de-radicalisation: counter-narrative and rehabilitation programmes to blunt the appeal of transnational jihad.
• Maintain credible deterrence: retain the demonstrated capacity for calibrated, proactive responses against terror infrastructure.

Synthesis

India’s counter-terrorism policy fuses principle with pragmatism: an uncompromising rejection of any distinction between good and bad terrorists, patient coalition-building for a global legal framework, and a growing readiness to act directly when diplomacy is exhausted.

The unfinished agenda is to convert India’s moral clarity into an enforceable global consensus that leaves no sponsor of terror a place to hide.