India and South-East Asia Policy

Introduction: Why South East Asia Matters

South East Asia (SEA) lies to the south of China, east of the Indian subcontinent and north-west of Australia. It is a belt of eleven countries split into a mainland zone (Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam) and a maritime zone (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, Timor-Leste).

Home to a combined population of over 675 million and a collective GDP exceeding $3 trillion, the region sits astride the world’s busiest sea lanes and has become one of the fastest-growing economic theatres on the planet.

For India the region is not a distant frontier but part of its extended neighbourhood. Geography places India at the western gateway to the Indo-Pacific; history binds the two through more than two millennia of trade, migration and the eastward spread of Indian religion, script and epic.

The strategic thinker K.M. Panikkar argued as early as the 1940s that India should build interdependence with SEA so as to form a sphere of co-prosperity with India at its centre, while Jawaharlal Nehru believed India’s location and latent power could make it the pivot of Asia. That civilisational and geopolitical logic is the deepest of the key drivers shaping India’s policy toward the region.

The Key Drivers at a Glance Geographic: proximity to the Indo-Pacific, the Malacca chokepoint and India’s own North-East land bridge to the mainland. Economic: access to fast-growing markets, investment, energy resources and integration with regional value chains. Strategic: countering Chinese assertiveness, keeping sea lanes open, and India’s emerging role as a net security provider. Civilisational & Diaspora: shared Buddhist–Hindu heritage and an influential Indian-origin community across the region.

Historical Background: From Civilisational Ties to Cold War Estrangement

Ancient and Civilisational Foundations

The Indian imprint on SEA is ancient and organic. Buddhism travelled eastward from the 5th century BCE, and Indian epics reshaped local culture — surviving today as the Thai Ramakien and the Javanese Ramayana.

The Chola dynasty maintained a maritime presence, even naming and settling early Singapore, while Emperor Ashoka sent a mission to Swarnabhumi to propagate Buddhism. Temple complexes such as Angkor Wat and Ta Prohm in Cambodia remain living monuments to this shared inheritance, and India participates in their restoration to this day.

The Nehruvian Era: Decolonisation and Non-Alignment

At independence, the promotion of decolonisation was a core element of India’s foreign policy. India opposed imperialism on economic, moral and strategic grounds, reasoning that strategic autonomy could only survive in a neighbourhood of free, decolonised states. This conviction produced concrete diplomacy:

• Indonesia (1945–49): When the Dutch tried to re-colonise Indonesia after Japan’s withdrawal, India — alongside Australia — took the issue to the United Nations, hosted the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia (January 1949), and helped secure the UNSC resolution (February 1949) that paved the way for Indonesian freedom. The two nations grew close, with India training Indonesian army officers.
• Indo-China: Under the Geneva Accord, three International Commissions of Supervision and Control — each chaired by India — were created for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, giving India a direct role in the region’s decolonisation.
• Non-Alignment as a bridge: Newly free states such as Burma and Indonesia embraced non-alignment, and India used the shared platform to build ties.

Yet the early promise faded. India’s inward-looking, autarkic economic model clashed with SEA’s outward, export-led growth model, so trade complementarities were lost. Nehru’s self-proclaimed leadership role bred suspicion — smaller states feared a new Indian hegemony replacing European rule.

Diaspora grievances added strain: when Burma’s Land Alienation Act of 1948 (the ‘Burma for Burmans’ policy) hurt the Chettiar community, Nehru declined to press the issue officially with U Nu, prioritising Burmese support for non-alignment over the immigrants’ concerns.

Cold War Drift and Missed Opportunities

A cascade of events pushed India to the margins of the region:

• The 1962 Sino-Indian War convinced SEA that India could not be a credible military security-provider.
• In the 1965 India–Pakistan war, Indonesia sided with Pakistan — a diplomatic blow.
• India’s criticism of the US presence in Vietnam, and the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, were read in SEA as anti-Western alignment. When ASEAN was formed in 1967 with a pro-West, anti-communist tilt, India stood isolated.

The Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew, a friend of Nehru, was a rare voice urging a larger Indian role — even encouraging India to test a nuclear weapon to balance China and to train Singapore’s officers.

But a India weakened by 1962 and 1965 lacked both the capability and the strategic vision to respond. The scholar Manmohini Kaul summed up the whole Cold War record as one of *’missed opportunities, mistrust, misperception and bungling diplomacy.’*

Evolution of Policy: Look East to Act East

The end of the Cold War and India’s 1991 economic crisis together forced a strategic reorientation. As China grew assertive over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the late 1980s, ASEAN itself adopted a ‘Look West’ Policy, seeking India as a potential regional balancer. India responded, and its Eastward policy has since passed through three clear phases.

Look East Policy — Phase I (P.V. Narasimha Rao)

Launched in the wake of liberalisation (announced 1991–92, articulated by Rao in a 1994 Singapore lecture), the first phase was overwhelmingly economic.

India sought to attract investment, integrate with ASEAN and offer the grouping an alternative to over-dependence on China, while using its North-East as a springboard to the region.

Look East Policy — Phase II (A.B. Vajpayee)

The second phase widened both the geography and the agenda: it extended engagement to East Asia and added a security and strategic dimension to the earlier economic thrust.

The complementary Gujral Doctrine — of not insisting on reciprocity from smaller neighbours — further softened India’s regional posture.

From Look East to Act East (Narendra Modi, 2014)

As the policy matured, India secured Free Trade Agreements in goods (2010) and services (2014) and Indo-ASEAN trade crossed the $100-billion milestone.

In 2011 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged India to not merely *look* east but *act* east. In 2014, at the 12th India-ASEAN Summit in Nay Pyi Taw (Myanmar), Prime Minister Modi formally rechristened the policy the Act East Policy (AEP).

Its guiding theme is the three Cs — Culture, Commerce and Connectivity — extended across the wider Asia-Pacific, adding strategic content and using India’s Buddhist legacy as soft power to realign foreign policy along its historical eastward axis.

In a signal gesture of outreach, the heads of all ten ASEAN states were joint chief guests at India’s 2018 Republic Day.

Evolution of India’s Eastward Policy

Look East — Phase I (Rao, 1991–94):  SEA + Economic Integration

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Look East — Phase II (Vajpayee):  + East Asia + Security

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Act East Policy (Modi, 2014):  Culture + Commerce + Connectivity, Asia-Pacific-wide, Strategic

Significance of India–South East Asia Relations

The relationship carries weight across every dimension of India’s national interest — political, economic, strategic, cultural and diaspora.

• Political & Diplomatic: ASEAN is central to the Act East Policy and to India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific. Membership of ASEAN-led platforms magnifies India’s diplomatic voice and endorses the principle of ASEAN Centrality.
• Economic: ASEAN is India’s 4th largest trading partner, accounting for about 11% of India’s global trade, with two-way trade of $122.67 billion in 2023–24. Together India and ASEAN generate roughly 7% of global GDP and hold 26% of the world’s population — a vast market and investment pool.
• Strategic: The region straddles the sea lanes carrying the bulk of India’s trade and energy. Partnership underpins India’s role as a net security provider and its ability to balance a rising China in the Indo-Pacific.
• Cultural & Civilisational: Shared Buddhist and Hindu heritage — from Angkor Wat to the Ramakien — gives India a reservoir of soft power unmatched by any external power.
• Diaspora: A large, influential Indian-origin community anchors economic and people-to-people links (discussed in Section 7).

Areas of Cooperation

Trade and Investment

Economic integration remains the bedrock. The India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in goods came into force in 2010, followed by services and investment agreements, embedding India in regional value chains.

India draws on its comparative advantage in IT, higher education and medical tourism, and continues to extend lines of credit to deepen commercial ties. A review of the FTA is now under way to make it more balanced and contemporary.

Connectivity

Physical connectivity is the spine of the Act East Policy, designed to link India’s North-East with mainland SEA:

• India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway — a road artery from Moreh to Mae Sot, with proposals to extend it to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (the CLMV states).
• Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project — linking Kolkata to Myanmar’s Sittwe port and onward to Mizoram by river and road.
• Mekong-India Economic Corridor (MIEC) — a proposed maritime and land corridor connecting India to the Mekong sub-region.

Defence and Maritime Security

Security cooperation has moved from the periphery to the core of the relationship:

• India and ASEAN held their first joint maritime exercise in May 2023, and India co-chaired the inaugural ASEAN-India Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting (November 2022) with Cambodia.
• An agreement allows Indian Navy ships logistical support at Singapore’s Changi naval base; bilateral naval engagement runs through the SIMBEX and MILAN exercises.
• Defence diplomacy now extends to exports — notably the BrahMos missile system to the Philippines (India’s landmark defence sale) — and to training partnerships with Vietnam and Myanmar, alongside the MALABAR exercise supporting a rules-based maritime order.

Energy, Science and Technology

• Energy: Indian firms explore hydrocarbons in the Nam Con Son basin off Vietnam’s coast, and SEA states participate in the International Solar Alliance.
• Science & Technology: The ASEAN-India Science & Technology Development Fund finances joint R&D and technology exchange.

Culture, Diaspora and Sub-Regional Groupings

• Cultural diplomacy: India’s restoration of Angkor Wat and Ta Prohm, and the living legacy of Buddhism and the Ramayana, sustain deep civilisational ties.
• Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC): Brings together India with Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam for cooperation in tourism, culture, education, transport and connectivity.

Counter-Terrorism

India and ASEAN cooperate against transnational terrorism within ASEAN’s consensus-based framework. India signed a Joint Declaration to combat international terrorism at Bali in 2003 and, since 2009, contributes to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) work plan on counter-terrorism and transnational crime.

ASEAN’s own Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT, 2011) deliberately de-linked terrorism from religion while preserving each state’s non-interventionist right to frame its own laws — leaving scope for legal and technical, rather than political, cooperation.

Institutional Architecture and ASEAN Centrality

India engages the region largely through ASEAN-led mechanisms. India is part of the ASEAN Plus Six grouping (with China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia) and participates in the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+). The ASEAN-India Partnership was reinforced through a new Plan of Action (2021–2025).

What is ASEAN Centrality? ASEAN Centrality is the principle that ASEAN remains the leading, coordinating force shaping the regional architecture of the Indo-Pacific — keeping major powers engaged through ASEAN-led platforms (EAS, ARF, ADMM+). Strategic value: located at the crossroads of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, ASEAN acts as a champion of a rules-based order, a mediator in US–China rivalry, and a promoter of regional connectivity (e.g., MPAC 2025). India explicitly endorsed ASEAN Centrality in its Indo-Pacific vision at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue.

Key Bilateral Relationships and the Diaspora

Beyond the ASEAN-wide framework, India cultivates deep bilateral partnerships that give the policy texture and momentum.

Partner	Foundations & Milestones	Contemporary Thrust
Indonesia	Ties since 1949; Soekarno the first chief guest at India’s 1950 Republic Day; 75 years of relations in 2024.	Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2018); Samudra Shakti & Garuda Shakti exercises; Sabang port & Andaman–Aceh link; 2nd-largest ASEAN trade partner ($29.4 bn, 2023-24); SAGAR meets ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’.
Singapore	Chola-era links; diplomatic treaty 1965; DTAA 1994; CECA 2005.	Among India’s largest FDI sources; Changi logistics access; SIMBEX & MILAN; gateway for rupee internationalisation and global finance.
Thailand	Ashoka’s mission to Swarnabhumi; ties since 1947; Early Harvest Scheme (2003) leading to an FTA.	Core of Thailand’s ‘Look West’; anchored by BIMSTEC; 2012 MoU on defence cooperation; hedging against Chinese assertiveness.
Malaysia	Historic civilisational ties; diplomatic relations 1957; defence MoU 1993.	CECA (2010); cooperation in infrastructure, textiles, pharma, IT and healthcare; benefits from the India-ASEAN FTA.
Vietnam	Solidarity from the anti-colonial era; oil exploration partnership.	Comprehensive Strategic Partnership; defence lines of credit; hydrocarbon exploration in the Nam Con Son basin.
Taiwan	No formal diplomatic ties; India-Taipei Association & TECC set up in 1995.	Unofficial economic engagement under the Act East umbrella; complements Taiwan’s ‘Go South’ policy in trade, education and technology.

Role of the Indian Diaspora

• Economic contribution: Indian businesses such as the Tata Group generate jobs and growth across the region.
• Cultural bridge: The Ramayana and Mahabharata live on in local forms like the Thai Ramakien and Javanese Ramayana.
• Political influence: Persons of Indian origin have held senior office — for instance, S. Jayakumar in Singapore’s government.
• Philanthropy: Diaspora-led foundations support health and education, such as Tata Trusts’ work in rural Thailand.

Issues and Challenges

Despite steady progress, a persistent gap between promise and delivery continues to shadow the relationship.

• Widening trade deficit: India’s deficit with ASEAN ballooned from about $7.5 billion (2011) to roughly $44 billion (2023), feeding domestic anxiety that the FTA benefits ASEAN more than India.
• Withdrawal from RCEP: India’s 2019 exit from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership — over fears for its dairy, agriculture and manufacturing sectors and a flood of Chinese goods — disappointed ASEAN and cost India a seat in the region’s largest trade bloc.
• Connectivity delays: Flagship projects such as the Kaladan Multimodal and the Trilateral Highway have slipped repeatedly — partly because of slow development of India’s own North-East and instability in Myanmar.
• China’s shadow: Beijing’s economic weight and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) limit ASEAN’s room to leverage India as a counterweight.
• Bilateral over multilateral: India tends to deal with ASEAN states individually rather than through the grouping’s collective platforms, diluting its regional heft.
• Domestic constraints: Bureaucratic hurdles, a fragmented internal market, discomfort with foreign equity and gaps in port and border infrastructure have historically slowed integration — the reforms behind ‘Make in India’, GST and Sagarmala are attempts to remedy this.

Way Forward

• Rebalance trade: Review and expand the India-ASEAN FTA to correct the trade imbalance and open ASEAN markets in leather, pharma, textiles and services.
• Complete connectivity: Fast-track the Trilateral Highway and Kaladan projects and extend links to the wider CLMV region, developing the North-East as a genuine ‘Natural Economic Zone’.
• Deepen maritime cooperation: Secure the sea lines of communication and consider an ‘Indo-Pacific Maritime Partnership’ to build a mutually beneficial security architecture with ASEAN.
• Advance the 10-Point Plan: Operationalise the vision set out at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, anchored in respect for ASEAN Centrality.
• Counterbalance China constructively: Offer credible economic and security alternatives to the BRI without forcing ASEAN into binary choices.
• Invest in people: Expand academic, cultural and youth exchanges and leverage the diaspora and Buddhist soft power to convert civilisational goodwill into strategic depth.

Conclusion

India’s engagement with South East Asia has travelled a long arc — from the confident pan-Asianism of the Nehruvian dawn, through the estrangement and missed opportunities of the Cold War, to the purposeful re-engagement of the Look East and Act East eras.

The key drivers today are unmistakable: geography that makes the region India’s Indo-Pacific gateway, an economic pull of vast and growing markets, the strategic imperative of balancing China and securing the sea lanes, and a civilisational bond that no rival can replicate.

The challenge is no longer one of vision but of delivery — closing the gap between ambition and outcome by completing connectivity, correcting trade imbalances and matching diplomatic warmth with strategic substance.

If India can act as decisively as it now looks, South East Asia will remain the most natural and rewarding arena of its rise as an Asian and global power.