Second Phase of the Debate (1936–37)

This was not a period of dramatic mass movements like Civil Disobedience, but of strategic soul-searching within the Congress — a struggle to decide how to fight the empire next.

⚖️ Background: From Repression to Reform

By 1935, the British had enacted the Government of India Act, and by early 1937, they announced provincial elections under it.
They hoped that these reforms would:

• Draw Indian leaders into the constitutional framework,
• Create divisions within Congress, and
• Reduce the spirit of confrontation.

However, the Indian National Congress, while rejecting the Act as “wholly unsatisfactory,” decided to contest the elections — not to endorse the Act, but to expose its hollowness.

The Congress’s logic was strategic:

“Let us enter the elections to show that the Act has no support among the Indian people.”

But this decision raised a much deeper question —
👉 If we win, should we form governments under the very Act we reject?

And that’s where the second great ideological debate began.

🧩 The Core Question: To Take Office or Not?

Once the Congress realised it might win in several provinces, an internal dilemma emerged:

“If we get a majority, should we accept office — or refuse it as a matter of principle?”

This question divided the party sharply along ideological lines —
the Left and the Right.

🔴 The Left Wing (Opponents of Office Acceptance)

The Left, led by Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Chandra Bose, Congress Socialists, and Communists, was against accepting office.

Their arguments were deeply ideological and revolutionary in tone:

1. Moral-Political Inconsistency:
   • The Congress had rejected the Government of India Act of 1935 as undemocratic.
   • So, forming governments under that same Act would appear hypocritical and morally weak.
2. Complicity with Imperialism:
   • Taking office meant cooperating with the British machinery, which had been built to sustain imperial rule.
   • That would make the Congress a junior partner in colonial administration, not a force of liberation.
3. Limited Power, Limited Impact:
   • Provincial governments would have little real power, as Governors could veto or override any decision.
   • Therefore, ministers would achieve little for the people, but lose credibility in the process.
4. Revolutionary Energy at Risk:
   • Accepting office might dilute the spirit of struggle.
   • The Congress might become bureaucratic rather than revolutionary.
   • The movement’s radical character — its power to inspire sacrifice — would fade.

Thus, Nehru and Bose argued that the Congress should instead use the elections to enter the legislatures, create deadlocks, and make the Act unworkable — exactly as the Swarajists had done in the 1920s.

Their goal: to expose the system, not to run it.

🔵 The Right Wing (Supporters of Office Acceptance)

On the other side were leaders like Rajendra Prasad, Vallabhbhai Patel, C. Rajagopalachari, and others — often referred to as the Right or Moderate Wing within Congress.

Their reasoning was practical and strategic rather than ideological.

They argued:

1. No Mass Movement Possible Yet:
   • The country was not ready for another round of mass agitation after the exhaustion of the Civil Disobedience Movement.
   • Therefore, working within the system was a temporary yet necessary step.
2. Use Power Constructively:
   • Even within limited powers, Congress ministries could improve the lives of ordinary Indians —
     through village upliftment, Harijan welfare, promotion of khadi, prohibition, education, and agricultural relief.
   • This would strengthen the Congress’s base among the people.
3. Avoid Leaving a Vacuum:
   • If Congress refused to form governments, pro-British or communal parties might take office instead.
   • That would weaken nationalism and give the British a propaganda victory.

Thus, the Right wing saw office acceptance not as betrayal, but as tactical engagement — using the colonial framework to advance national interests from within.

⚖️ Gandhi’s Changing Position

Initially, Mahatma Gandhi sided with the Left.
He felt that joining the government would:

• Make the Congress appear to approve of the 1935 Act, and
• Distract it from its spiritual and constructive mission among the masses.

He therefore advised focusing on village work and preparing quietly for the next phase of Civil Disobedience.

But by early 1936, Gandhi began to rethink this position.
He realised:

• The “village preparation” idea was impractical in the short term.
• Meanwhile, the elections offered a chance to test Congress’s popularity and train leaders in governance.

Gradually, he accepted that forming ministries could be tried — provided that moral discipline was maintained and participation didn’t weaken the spirit of struggle.

This was a subtle but significant shift — showing Gandhi’s flexibility and strategic sense.

🏛️ The Final Congress Decision

In early 1936, the Congress took a middle path.

• It decided to contest the elections,
• But postponed the decision on forming ministries until after the results were known.

This diplomatic decision kept both factions united:

• The Left could still believe the Congress was contesting elections only to expose the Act,
• While the Right could hope for office acceptance later if conditions were favourable.

In this way, the Congress displayed remarkable political maturity — maintaining internal unity despite serious ideological differences.

“Similar to 1922–24 and 1934, both factions of the Congress, respecting each other and trusting their shared commitment to the anti-imperialist struggle, avoided splitting the party.”

This unity would soon prove critical, because the 1937 elections were about to bring Congress an unexpected and historic victory — changing the very nature of the nationalist movement.

🔍 To Sum Up: The Significance of the Second Phase

The debate of 1936–37 wasn’t merely about elections; it was about the philosophy of freedom:

• Should India fight from outside the colonial system — through agitation and boycott?
• Or should it fight from within — by capturing the limited spaces of power the British had opened?

This tension between moral idealism (Nehru–Bose) and political realism (Gandhi–Patel–Rajaji) defined much of Congress politics in the late 1930s.

And as we’ll see in the next phase, when the 1937 elections were held, this debate reached its climax — as Congress ministries took power in seven provinces, revealing both the potential and the limitations of constitutional politics under colonial rule.