Simon Commission

To understand the significance of the Simon Commission and its boycott, we must first place ourselves in the political environment of 1927.
By this time, the nationalist movement seemed to have entered a phase of decline. There was a sense of hopelessness and stagnation. Why so? Let us look at the conditions:

• Gandhi in retirement: After suspending the Non-Cooperation Movement in 1922, Gandhi had gradually withdrawn from active politics. By 1927, he was living in seclusion at Sabarmati Ashram. His absence created a leadership vacuum.
• Swarajists split: The Swaraj Party, formed in 1923 by leaders like C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru, was itself divided by internal differences. The unity required to challenge the British effectively was missing.
• Communalism flourishing: The British policy of divide and rule was bearing fruit. Hindu-Muslim tensions were increasing, weakening the national struggle.
• Revolutionary activities rising: In the absence of mass mobilization, many young revolutionaries turned to radical methods. Though brave, these efforts were sporadic and lacked an organized national strategy.

This was the backdrop against which Gandhi, in May 1927, wrote a rather despairing line: “My only hope lies in prayer and answer to prayer.” It reflected his feeling that politics was not moving forward with the same energy as during the Non-Cooperation days.

Yet, history has its turning points. Behind the apparent silence, forces of resurgence were quietly gathering momentum. And soon, a spark came from an unexpected source: the announcement of the Simon Commission in November 1927. This moment transformed India’s political scene, pulling it out of gloom and setting it back on the path of mass struggle.

The Simon Commission: Background and Purpose

Now, what exactly was the Simon Commission?

According to the Government of India Act, 1919, a commission was to be appointed after ten years to review the working of constitutional reforms. That meant such a body was expected around 1929.

But on 8 November 1927, Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, announced the Indian Statutory Commission—commonly called the Simon Commission—headed by Sir John Simon.

Its mandate was:

1. To inquire into how provincial governments were functioning.
2. To assess whether representative institutions (like legislative councils) were working satisfactorily.
3. To recommend further steps for responsible government, i.e., the next phase of constitutional reforms.

Why Was It Appointed Early?

Here arises a key question: If the Commission was due in 1929, why was it sent two years earlier, in 1927?

There were several political calculations behind this:

1. British domestic politics: A general election in Britain was due in 1929. The Conservative Party feared that the Labour Party (which was more sympathetic towards Indian demands) might come to power. To avoid leaving Indian reforms in Labour’s hands, the Conservatives hurriedly sent the Commission in 1927.
2. Communal tensions in India: The British wanted the Commission to visit India at a time when Hindu-Muslim relations were strained. This would allow them to argue that Indians were not capable of governing themselves due to their disunity.
3. Nationalist demands: By the mid-1920s, Indian leaders were no longer satisfied with the dyarchy introduced by the 1919 Act. They were pressing for a complete overhaul of the system. The British wanted to get ahead of this demand and control the process.
4. Youth and Swarajist activities: Leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose were mobilizing youth and pressing for radical change. The Swaraj Party was also making constitutional demands from within the councils. The British wanted to pre-empt this rising pressure.

The Composition of the Simon Commission

• The Commission had seven members, drawn from Britain’s three main political parties—Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour.
• Notably, not a single Indian was included.

The British gave two official reasons for excluding Indians:

1. The committee had to report to the British Parliament, so it was kept entirely British.
2. There was no single, unified Indian opinion about constitutional reforms, so including Indians would not be “fair.”

But the real reason was more strategic. Lord Birkenhead feared that if Indian leaders were included, they might ally with British Labour representatives (who were relatively pro-India). Such a coalition could challenge Conservative control over Indian policy.

Thus, the Simon Commission was deliberately kept “all-white”—something that would ignite one of the most powerful waves of political protest in the freedom movement.

The Boycott — how an insult became a spark

When the Simon Commission arrived, Indians saw more than a bureaucratic review: they saw an insult. Excluding all Indians from a body meant to recommend India’s constitutional future was read as a denial of self-determination and a deliberate affront to national self-respect. That feeling of insult quickly turned into action.

At the Madras session of the Indian National Congress (1927) the party decided to boycott the Commission “at every stage and in every form.” This was not just a Congress decision: the call to boycott drew support from a wide and sometimes surprising set of groups — and opposition from others — which shows how the Commission acted like a political lightning rod.

Who supported and who opposed — a mixed political map

The reaction was not uniform. Broadly:

• Opponents of the Commission included the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League under M. A. Jinnah, the Hindu Mahasabha, many revolutionaries (e.g., Bhagat Singh), and youth groups led by Nehru and Subhas Bose.
• Supporters (or at least non-opponents) included some conservatives in Britain, sections of the Muslim League under other leaders (e.g., Muhammed Shafi), the Justice Party in Madras, the Unionists in Punjab, and certain community organizations (e.g., Bahishkrit Hitakarni Sabha under Ambedkar initially didn’t oppose it).

This patchwork reaction highlights two things: (1) Indian politics was fragmented by caste, community and regional interests, and (2) the Commission nevertheless forced temporary alliances and brought differences into the open.

Mass protest: hartals, black flags, and a revived spirit

When the Commission reached Indian soil (first visit Feb–Mar 1928), the country responded with a wave of hartals (general strikes) and black-flag demonstrations under the slogan “Simon Go Back.” These were not scripted elite actions; they revived the energy and visible mass mobilization of the Non-Cooperation days. Crowds, hartals and demonstrations greeted the Commission wherever it went, and the protests were often led and energized by youth leagues and students — a new and important feature of the movement.

Government repression, martyrdom and revolutionary response

The colonial government reacted with force. Police suppression was harsh and at times brutal: senior Congress leaders were not spared — Jawaharlal Nehru and Govind Ballabh Pant were beaten during protests. In Lahore, a lathi-charge on a procession led by Lala Lajpat Rai left him grievously injured; he later succumbed to those injuries. That event provoked a revolutionary response: a group led by Bhagat Singh assassinated Assistant Superintendent Saunders in an act of political vengeance.

(These episodes show a familiar dynamic: repression breeds radicalization, and martyrdom deepens the moral force of a movement.)

The Simon Commission Report (May 1930) — recommendations and limits

By the time the Commission published its report in May 1930, the political scene had already moved on: the report had lost political purchase and was widely rejected. Still, its recommendations mattered because they shaped later legislation (notably they helped lay conceptual ground for the Government of India Act, 1935). Key recommendations were:

• Abolition of Dyarchy in the provinces and establishment of responsible unitary government at provincial level. (Dyarchy = the split of provincial subjects between elected Indian ministers and appointed officials.)
• Retention of separate electorates (i.e., communal electorates where specific communities elected their own representatives).
• Reservation of seats for the Depressed Classes (what contemporary documents referred to as the Depressed Classes).
• Advocacy of a federal structure for India — a Greater India federating British India and princely states — while retaining British Paramountcy (the Viceroy would still play the paramount role).
• Separation of Burma from India and Sindh from Bombay (administrative separations the Commission recommended).

Crucially, the Commission did not commit to establishing a responsible government at the centre (it deferred that), and its position on Dominion status was vague. In short: some provincial reforms were offered, but ultimate sovereignty and central authority remained firmly in British hands. Indians — who by then had been mobilized and radicalized — rejected this half-measures approach.

Youth, slogans and symbols — Yusuf Meherally and the power of phrase

One of the social-political takeaways from the boycott was the role of language and youth organization. Yusuf Meherally, who founded the Bombay Youth League (1928), coined slogans that cut across classes and stuck in public memory — “Simon Go Back” during the boycott and later “Quit India” in 1942.

Short, sharp slogans helped massify protest and gave protesters a collective identity. The prominence of youth leagues and student bodies under leaders like Nehru and Subhas Bose was especially important: they supplied energy, organization and a readiness to confront repression.

Why this phase mattered — the bigger picture

• It ended the lull of 1927. What had looked like political stagnation became a reinvigorated movement.
• It temporarily united diverse groups. Even groups that often disagreed found common cause in rejecting the Commission — a rare moment of cross-party solidarity.
• It revived mass methods. Hartals, black flags, student leagues and street protests reintroduced mass confrontation as a central mode of politics.
• Repression radicalized parts of the movement. Police brutality and the death of leaders (real or perceived) pushed some activists toward revolutionary action, raising the stakes of the struggle.
• Institutionally, the Commission’s recommendations were inadequate for Indian expectations; the report’s partial reforms and retention of British paramountcy convinced many Indians that only continued mass pressure could secure meaningful change — a conviction that fed into the Civil Disobedience Movement and the events of 1930–31.